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A learned early in my career as a busi-
ness economist that perhaps the worst
answer an economist can give to a ques-
tion is, "I don't know." And having
spent much of my life in the company of
economists, I can honestly say it is a
response I've not often heard. I am
reminded of the remark Paul Samuelson
once made about Milton Friedman: "I
wish I was as certain about anything as
Milton Friedman is about everything."
Perhaps we are, as many believe, a
profession that is frequently wrong,
though never in doubt.
But the value of an economist's opinion
is not in its "correctness" in the sense that
we can always, or even often, foresee the
chaotic patterns in economic events. Basi-
cally, there are two types of criticism
directed at business economists and their
forecasts. The first is simply that we do
not forecast very accurately. The second,
which usually comes from the academic
community, is that economists should not
be expected to forecast at all, since the
pursuit of self-interest on the part of mil-
lions of people with "rational expecta-
tions" implies that no model can profit
consistently from the forecasting exercise.
Arguing that economic forecasting
can't be done is ludicrous. To borrow
from Descartes, "I exist, therefore I
forecast." No human action, whether
economic or otherwise, is taken without
at least an implicit assumption about
future events. The choices individuals
make involve intertemporal considera-
tions, so an opinion about the future is
implied in people's behavior. Often
what the forecaster is doing is helping
to make explicit, and internally consis-
tent, what otherwise was implicit in the
actions of society.
And it seems irrelevant to say that eco-
nomic forecasting shouldn't be done.
The single unifying principle in our
science is that consumers, motivated by
self-interest, generally determine what
will be produced, while producers, moti-
vated by profit, endeavor to satisfy that
demand. I know of no better determina-
tion of value than that dictated by the
marketplace. We need only consider the
large number of competing forecasts —
and the expense of producing them — to
appreciate that if forecasters even mar-
ginally reduce uncertainty about future
economic conditions, the savings to busi-
ness is potentially huge.
Nevertheless, I believe that econo-
mists' ability to predict macroeconomic
variables is a poor standard by which
to evaluate most economic models, and
an even worse standard by which to
judge the contribution of business econ-
omists. We must not equate our fore-
casting record with the presumption
that economists have in large measure
failed to add value to the decisionmak-
ing process.
Should the economics profession be
judged on its ability to predict where
the economy is headed? In a recent
speech, Cleveland Federal Reserve
Bank President Jerry L. Jordan
answered critics who assert as much,
arguing that although economists can-
not eliminate the uncertainties of the
marketplace, their real contribution
lies in providing a proper framework
for discussing and evaluating those
uncertainties.
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opinions of economists? It is, I believe,
our ability to provide a model, or a
structure, capable of grasping a com-
plex economic environment.
I use the term structure here in the
sense that our judgments are based on a
logically consistent framework. But
such a framework is not necessarily
built around the goal of foretelling the
future. Imagine you are at a ball game,
and consider this question: Will you be
able to see the game better if you're
standing? The knee-jerk answer is yes,
of course. But this reply obviously
lacks the structure of a model. Upon
further reflection, we know that our
ability to see depends on the combined
actions of those around us. If in stand-
ing we induce others to do likewise,
our view will be obstructed. This is the
proper answer, I think, even though it
is likely to be a poor forecast of crowd
behavior.
• Forecasting and the
Policymaking Process
Ultimately, a model must be judged by
its usefulness. And in some cases, use-
fulness is defined by the ability to
predict future events. For example,
time-series models, which possess a
mathematical structure but are not
based on economic theory, have little
value other than their ability to fore-
cast. But clearly, there is no such thing
as a best model, for "best" must always
be defined in terms of the use to which
the model is being applied.
We are all familiar with the classic
debate between Ptolemy's model of the
solar system, which placed the earth at
the center, and Copernicus' model,
which put the sun there. The Ptolemaic
view was based on the moral assertion
that the center was the only proper
place for the earth to be. Despite this
arrangement's glaring inability to con-
form with the celestial evidence — the
model had obvious flaws known to the
scientific community — it nevertheless
provided reasonably accurate forecasts
of the planets' movements and was
popularly used.
Fundamental to all economic analysis,
then, is the simple question, Why do
we want to know? Herein lies an impor-
tant difference between forecasting in
the private versus the public sector.
In the private sector, forecasts are used as
devices not only to reduce uncertainty,
but to provide a framework for compre-
hending the risks that business should be
aware of and, if desirable, protect against.
Unfolding events affect the probabilities
of alternative economic states that even-
tually impact business profitability. As a
former business economist for a bank
whose goal was to maximize shareholder
wealth, I know that a potential tilt in the
term structure of interest rates, a shift in
loan demand, or a change in the probabil-
ity of borrower default are contingencies
that need to be evaluated and acted upon.
A commercial bank cannot put together a
profit plan or prepare a budget without
assumptions about future interest rates,
deposit growth, and numerous other vari-
ables. But this is not true for the eco-
nomic policymaker in the public arena
Two years ago, Federal Reserve Chair-
man Alan Greenspan addressed the an-
nual meeting of the National Association
of Business Economists on the topic of
forecasting. "The policy forecaster," he
said, "necessarily focuses on those
aspects of the economy that policy most
directly influences." So the role of
forecasting in the public sector, it would
seem, is as a conduit of control.
Regarding the act of forecasting as a
control device forces us to identify
clearly those variables that are en-
dogenous to the system and those that
are exogenous. For the policymaker,
that means we must distinguish the
outcomes we can predictably influence
from those we only wish we could.
We can think of the policy-setting proc-
ess in three parts: 1) a goal, 2) control-
lable instruments, and 3) a model linking
instruments to the goal. As I review my
own experiences with the policymaking
process, I recall the 1970s as a time when
the Federal Reserve attempted to manage
real economic events by judiciously alter-
ing the federal funds rate. Stabilizing
short-run fluctuations in the business
cycle and maintaining a low unemploy-
ment rate are, without question, ad-
mirable goals. And I certainly recog-
nize that the Fed has been able to
control the federal funds rate when it
has chosen to do so (although I have
never accepted this instrument as an ap-
propriate indicator of policy).
But like a Copemican in a Ptolemaic
world, I believe there are flaws in a
model that presumes to link the level of
short-run nominal interest rates to a
nation's long-run economic prosperity.
This Phillips curve model is founded on
an empirical observation we know to be
inconsistent with fully informed, long-
run optimizing behavior.
Nevertheless, analogous to the Ptolemaic
view, we might have been able to estab-
lish an effective policy on the basis of
such a model if it had proved useful for
exploiting short-run imperfections in the
marketplace. My interpretation of 30
years of short-run policy management
based on this approach is that it en-
gendered a legacy of rising inflation and,
ultimately, unnecessarily high rates of
economic inefficiency. Simply put, the
Phillips curve model proved to be un-
stable when policymakers tried to exploit
the economic inefficiencies it implied,
eventually contributing to exaggerated
business cycles and reduced productivity
growth. To rephrase an old expression, in
the long run, it made us dead.
The misconceived effort to exploit the
Phillips curve played a key role in expos-
ing the importance of the expectations
process linking the nominal to the real.
Forward-looking expectations have been
a valuable extension to both the Phillips
curve and general-equilibrium models of
the business cycle, leading our profession
to reformulate its conception of monetary
policy from that of an action at a single
point in time to a recognition that there
are important feedbacks between mone-
tary policy and market forces.This has had practical implications for
the conduct of monetary policy. Past
monetary policy is largely irrelevant ex-
cept as a guide to predicting future
policy. Since it is the future that mat-
ters, people will look to the operations,
the procedures, the strategies, and the
objectives of the Federal Reserve to
predict the performance of policy as
events unfold.
• The Importance of Long-Run
Objectives in Policymaking
The lessons of the 1970s pointed the
way to a new procedure for implement-
ing monetary policy. In its 1980 report
to Congress, the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) expressly recog-
nized the limits of monetary manage-
ment, confessing that it is not within
the powers of policy to ensure a fully
satisfactory economic performance at
all times. "Nonetheless," the report
states, "the appropriate direction of
policy is clear. The greatest contribu-
tion the monetary and fiscal authorities
can make is to impart a sense of long-
range stability in policy and in the
economic environment."
Chief among the Federal Reserve's ob-
jectives was the restoration of price
stability or, in the words of the FOMC,
"wringing inflation out of the economy
over time," a goal that is understood to
be the exclusive province of the mone-
tary authority.
The instrument, or means, for achiev-
ing price stability was to be adherence
to monetary targeting. Such targets
have two benefits: They provide a
benchmark against which to judge the
performance of policy, and they are a
clear means of conveying policy intent,
both of which seem to be necessary
preconditions for imparting a sense of
long-run stability.
The framework that connects the mone-
tary instrument to the inflation objec-
tive is, of course, the equation of ex-
change, or an empirical description of
that equation, such as the P-Star (P*)
model.
4 Although we may think of P*
as a forecasting device, in a strict sense
its value to policymakers is as an
indicator of the long-run inflationary
consequences of M2 growth. In fact,
there may be other models that provide
equally accurate or even superior quar-
terly inflation forecasts. But to the ex-
tent that they rely on factors outside the
scope of the monetary authority, such
as oil prices, their value to monetary
decisionmaking is reduced.
This is the structure that has guided
monetary policy over much of the post-
1979 period, and not coincidently, I
believe, we have achieved much in re-
ducing the inflation trend in this coun-
try. But as you are no doubt aware,
several recent developments appear to
have diminished our ability, if not our
resolve, to eliminate inflation. For one,
the recession that began in 1990 and
our relatively slow economic recovery
have diverted attention once again to
the performance of real economic vari-
ables, such as employment growth. At
the same time, the linkage between M2
growth and the Fed's short-run policy
target, the federal funds rate, appears to
have been altered substantially, at least
for the moment.
Some monetarist economists argue that
the lackluster economy is compelling
evidence that M2 is still a reliable in-
dicator of the thrust of monetary policy
and that we must not be so quick to dis-
miss it. Others, including the Shadow
Open Market Committee, argue for cau-
tion in interpreting M2's behavior. In
their opinion, the monetary stimulus
implied by the aggregate's recent slug-
gishness may be understated because
of commercial banks' diminished im-
portance as financial channels. It is
necessary in such an uncertain environ-
ment to allow more discretion in the
implementation of policy. However, it
is precisely at times like this that con-
sistent, long-run policy goals are most
important, so that the Federal Reserve's
ultimate objective is not among the
many uncertainties the public must
guard against.
• The Implicit Promises
of Policy Behavior
Changes in structure are, of course, in-
evitable, though it may be years before
a shift is clearly identifiable. We do not
now know the significance of either the
M2/fed funds rate breakdown or the ap-
parent acceleration in M2 velocity, and
we may not know for an indefinite
period of time. That is why it is impor-
tant for policymakers to target long-run
outcomes, not short-run instruments.
The long-run objective of monetary
policy is still the promotion of eco-
nomic growth through the elimination
of inflation, in the sense that inflation
will no longer enter into the economic
decisions of households and firms. Cur-
rent readings from the P* model give
me reason to believe that the monetary
policy of the past several years is con-
sistent with the ultimate attainment of
this goal.
But while I may believe that a disinfla-
tion groundwork has been laid, infla-
tion expectations are still an integral
part of decisionmaking in the private sec-
tor. Household surveys, private forecasts,
and the historic steepness of the yield
curve all reveal long-run inflation expec-
tations at or above the post-World War II
average inflation rate. Unfortunately,
over the past several years the public has
become conditioned to the idea that
policy actions are determined by the cur-
rent state of the real economy and, in par-
ticular, by monthly employment growth.
The September 4 cut in the federal funds
rate to 3 percent marked the eighth time
since December 1990 that the rate was
reduced on the same day weak employ-
ment data were released—a synchroniza-
tion that induces financial markets to
view the Federal Reserve as taking re-
sponsibility for the economy's short-run
performance. By appearing to respond to
poor economic reports while also ignor-
ing the shortfall of M2 from its explicit
target, we risk damaging credibility about
our resolve to achieve sustainable eco-
nomic growth through price stability.
I understand that there are good reasons
to be skeptical about the interpretation of
slow M2 growth. But above all else,
policymakers should endeavor to provide
clarity—in a word, structure—to the
monetary policy decisionmaking process.• Conclusion
Economists have opinions. Whether they
are more informed opinions than those of
noneconomists depends on their rigorous
adherence to a framework of analysis, or
to a model. Although we may not be able
to reduce all, or perhaps even most, of the
uncertainties in the marketplace, econo-
mists nevertheless provide a structure for
discussing and evaluating the problems
we all face. Such frameworks are useful
even in their shortcomings by revealing
that which we do not yet understand.
As a policymaker whose actions affect
the private sector, I believe that struc-
ture is necessary not only as a guide to
policy decisions, but as a means for
transmitting the significance of those
decisions to the marketplace. For this
reason, it is crucial that policy pre-
commit to goals that it can be counted
on, and held accountable, to achieve.
In the year of his death, Copernicus
wrote:
Finally, we shall place the Sun himself
at the center of the Universe. All of this
is suggested by the systematic proces-
sion of events and the harmony of the
whole Universe, if only we face the
facts, as they say. "with both eyes open."
For astronomers, this means placing
the center of the universe not where
they want it to be, but rather where the
facts say it must be. For policymakers,
it means being careful of what we
promise, either by our implied actions
or by our explicit neglect.
• Footnotes
1. See Alan Greenspan, "Economic Fore-
casting in the Private and Public Sectors,"
speech presented to the annual meeting of
the National Association of Business Econ-
omists, Washington D.C., September 24,
1990.
2. See the Federal Open Market Commit-
tee's Monetary Policy Report to Congress,
March 1980, p. 2.
3. Ibid, p. 3.
4. The equation of exchange, MV = PQ, re-
lates the quantity of money (M) to nominal
spending (PQ) through the velocity of money
(V). P* is essentially a trend interpretation of
this equation.
5. For an overview of the forecasting per-
formance of the P* model and an example of
a commodity-based alternative that produces
better near-term forecasts, see Jeffrey J.
Hallman and Edward J. Bryden, "Com-
modity Prices and P-Star," Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland, Economic Review, vol.
28, no. 1 (1992 Quarter l),pp. 11-17.
President Jordan presented this speech to the
Cleveland chapter of the National Associa-
tion of Business Economists on September
23,1992.
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